1
00:00:29,589 --> 00:00:25,830
hello

2
00:00:31,189 --> 00:00:29,599
my name is bob griffin i had the honor

3
00:00:33,030 --> 00:00:31,199
along with my friend john young

4
00:00:35,430 --> 00:00:33,040
of flying the first space shuttle into

5
00:00:38,470 --> 00:00:35,440
orbit back in april of 1981.

6
00:00:41,430 --> 00:00:38,480
it was a fantastic flight one that i'll

7
00:00:41,910 --> 00:00:41,440
always remember the shuttle has done

8
00:00:45,350 --> 00:00:41,920
some

9
00:00:47,590 --> 00:00:45,360
magnificent things it has revolutionized

10
00:00:48,869 --> 00:00:47,600
the way we uh we fly in space and it's

11
00:00:51,990 --> 00:00:48,879
done things that we couldn't

12
00:00:54,709 --> 00:00:52,000
have done with any other kind of vehicle

13
00:00:56,389 --> 00:00:54,719
we also have revolutionized our

14
00:00:59,590 --> 00:00:56,399
knowledge of the solar system

15
00:01:02,470 --> 00:00:59,600
and of the universe with missions like

16
00:01:04,469 --> 00:01:02,480
magellan galileo and the hubble space

17
00:01:07,429 --> 00:01:04,479
telescope

18
00:01:08,310 --> 00:01:07,439
then we went on to work international

19
00:01:11,190 --> 00:01:08,320
relations

20
00:01:12,390 --> 00:01:11,200
by flying up to the russian mir and that

21
00:01:14,789 --> 00:01:12,400
relationship

22
00:01:16,149 --> 00:01:14,799
has allowed us to build the greatest

23
00:01:19,830 --> 00:01:16,159
engineering marvel of all the

24
00:01:23,670 --> 00:01:21,749
you can be proud of what the space

25
00:01:26,469 --> 00:01:23,680
shuttle has accomplished

26
00:01:27,590 --> 00:01:26,479
and you are the ones that made it happen

27
00:01:29,749 --> 00:01:27,600
i like to tell people

28
00:01:31,670 --> 00:01:29,759
that the space shuttle it's not about

29
00:01:32,950 --> 00:01:31,680
hardware it's not about software it's

30
00:01:36,950 --> 00:01:32,960
not about propellants

31
00:01:39,749 --> 00:01:36,960
it's about people the american workforce

32
00:01:41,270 --> 00:01:39,759
can accomplish wondrous things and

33
00:01:55,190 --> 00:01:41,280
you've proven that

34
00:01:57,270 --> 00:01:55,200
time and time again

35
00:01:58,469 --> 00:01:57,280
you know the initial flight was not

36
00:02:01,590 --> 00:01:58,479
without problems

37
00:02:05,190 --> 00:02:01,600
during the development we uh we ran

38
00:02:06,709 --> 00:02:05,200
into lots of problems the

39
00:02:09,190 --> 00:02:06,719
space shuttle tiles the thermal

40
00:02:11,670 --> 00:02:09,200
protection system and the main engines

41
00:02:13,350 --> 00:02:11,680
were probably the long poles in the tent

42
00:02:16,070 --> 00:02:13,360
but we worked those hard

43
00:02:17,270 --> 00:02:16,080
even though there was schedule pressure

44
00:02:21,270 --> 00:02:17,280
we were

45
00:02:23,670 --> 00:02:21,280
over two years behind and

46
00:02:25,110 --> 00:02:23,680
anytime you're in that kind of a program

47
00:02:27,350 --> 00:02:25,120
there is going to be

48
00:02:30,229 --> 00:02:27,360
schedule pressure it's always with you

49
00:02:32,630 --> 00:02:30,239
it comes with the territory

50
00:02:33,750 --> 00:02:32,640
but management at that time they treated

51
00:02:35,509 --> 00:02:33,760
it properly

52
00:02:39,030 --> 00:02:35,519
and where there was no other reasonable

53
00:02:41,110 --> 00:02:39,040
alternative they slipped the schedule

54
00:02:42,630 --> 00:02:41,120
about a month before the first flight

55
00:02:43,110 --> 00:02:42,640
john and i were at the kennedy space

56
00:02:45,430 --> 00:02:43,120
center

57
00:02:47,670 --> 00:02:45,440
doing a terminal countdown demonstration

58
00:02:50,309 --> 00:02:47,680
test which is pretty much of a dry run

59
00:02:52,070 --> 00:02:50,319
of what actually goes on when you go

60
00:02:54,949 --> 00:02:52,080
launch the shuttle

61
00:02:55,830 --> 00:02:54,959
test went great john and i climbed out

62
00:02:57,910 --> 00:02:55,840
of the cockpit

63
00:02:59,509 --> 00:02:57,920
went back to the crew quarters at the

64
00:03:00,869 --> 00:02:59,519
onc building

65
00:03:02,790 --> 00:03:00,879
and we were patting each other on the

66
00:03:04,390 --> 00:03:02,800
back said hey we're getting pretty close

67
00:03:06,630 --> 00:03:04,400
to flight

68
00:03:10,710 --> 00:03:06,640
that was when we got the bad news

69
00:03:15,430 --> 00:03:13,750
six technicians had climbed in

70
00:03:16,869 --> 00:03:15,440
the aft end of the vehicle where the

71
00:03:18,869 --> 00:03:16,879
engines are

72
00:03:20,149 --> 00:03:18,879
while it was being purged with pure

73
00:03:21,990 --> 00:03:20,159
nitrogen

74
00:03:23,670 --> 00:03:22,000
to prevent any kind of combustion and

75
00:03:25,270 --> 00:03:23,680
you always do that when you actually go

76
00:03:27,030 --> 00:03:25,280
launch and we did it in this test as

77
00:03:29,190 --> 00:03:27,040
well

78
00:03:30,949 --> 00:03:29,200
when they climbed in five of them

79
00:03:33,350 --> 00:03:30,959
immediately passed out

80
00:03:34,789 --> 00:03:33,360
his sixth thank goodness he saw that

81
00:03:37,350 --> 00:03:34,799
there was a problem

82
00:03:38,550 --> 00:03:37,360
call for help and managed to pull some

83
00:03:41,350 --> 00:03:38,560
of the people out

84
00:03:42,710 --> 00:03:41,360
but john bornstad was pronounced dead on

85
00:03:44,830 --> 00:03:42,720
the scene

86
00:03:46,470 --> 00:03:44,840
and forrest cole later died at the

87
00:03:49,350 --> 00:03:46,480
hospital

88
00:03:53,990 --> 00:03:49,360
senseless loss of life and it was

89
00:03:57,589 --> 00:03:55,270
when john and i climbed out of the

90
00:03:58,869 --> 00:03:57,599
cockpit there was a special test they

91
00:04:00,710 --> 00:03:58,879
wanted to run

92
00:04:02,630 --> 00:04:00,720
so they put in what we at the kennedy

93
00:04:04,630 --> 00:04:02,640
space center call a div or a deviation

94
00:04:07,350 --> 00:04:04,640
to the procedure

95
00:04:09,429 --> 00:04:07,360
they kept that nitrogen purge going on

96
00:04:13,350 --> 00:04:09,439
in the aft in

97
00:04:14,550 --> 00:04:13,360
but somebody said the pad was clear for

98
00:04:17,590 --> 00:04:14,560
work

99
00:04:19,509 --> 00:04:17,600
so these six techs they went ahead and

100
00:04:21,670 --> 00:04:19,519
climbed in the aft in

101
00:04:23,270 --> 00:04:21,680
meanwhile the test team that was running

102
00:04:25,030 --> 00:04:23,280
the deviation

103
00:04:26,710 --> 00:04:25,040
they weren't aware that that was going

104
00:04:29,909 --> 00:04:26,720
on

105
00:04:33,030 --> 00:04:29,919
it was a horrendous accident and

106
00:04:34,790 --> 00:04:33,040
it also proves that there is danger to

107
00:04:37,270 --> 00:04:34,800
those of you that are working

108
00:04:39,110 --> 00:04:37,280
on hardware and around propellants just

109
00:04:44,150 --> 00:04:39,120
as there is danger to the crews that

110
00:04:47,430 --> 00:04:46,469
we depend on you the people that are

111
00:04:49,510 --> 00:04:47,440
hands on

112
00:04:51,030 --> 00:04:49,520
touching the hardware doing the software

113
00:04:53,430 --> 00:04:51,040
touching the paper

114
00:04:55,430 --> 00:04:53,440
to be our first line and our last line

115
00:04:57,990 --> 00:04:55,440
of defense

116
00:04:59,510 --> 00:04:58,000
if you see something that is not growing

117
00:05:02,710 --> 00:04:59,520
right

118
00:05:06,230 --> 00:05:02,720
please please bring it

119
00:05:07,670 --> 00:05:06,240
to management's attention stop the work

120
00:05:10,070 --> 00:05:07,680
one of the biggest problems we have at

121
00:05:13,189 --> 00:05:10,080
nasa sometimes is our can-do attitude

122
00:05:15,270 --> 00:05:13,199
we're known for it that's one of our

123
00:05:16,870 --> 00:05:15,280
greatest assets but it's also one of our

124
00:05:20,070 --> 00:05:16,880
greatest liabilities

125
00:05:20,390 --> 00:05:20,080
the secret is knowing when can do is too

126
00:05:23,189 --> 00:05:20,400
much

127
00:05:24,469 --> 00:05:23,199
and is pushing too hard management and

128
00:05:26,469 --> 00:05:24,479
leadership

129
00:05:27,990 --> 00:05:26,479
need to keep their fingers on the pulse

130
00:05:29,909 --> 00:05:28,000
of the program

131
00:05:31,670 --> 00:05:29,919
i advise you to get out of your office

132
00:05:33,029 --> 00:05:31,680
get out of the conference room

133
00:05:35,590 --> 00:05:33,039
go out where the people are doing the

134
00:05:36,469 --> 00:05:35,600
work that's where you can get the best

135
00:05:39,029 --> 00:05:36,479
sense

136
00:05:39,909 --> 00:05:39,039
that something is amiss and if somebody

137
00:05:42,150 --> 00:05:39,919
brings

138
00:05:43,830 --> 00:05:42,160
it to your attention or you notice

139
00:05:47,029 --> 00:05:43,840
something that's not right

140
00:05:47,909 --> 00:05:47,039
call a timeout now that's not easy to do

141
00:05:50,390 --> 00:05:47,919
always

142
00:05:52,150 --> 00:05:50,400
because there is schedule pressure it

143
00:05:55,110 --> 00:05:52,160
will always be there

144
00:05:56,309 --> 00:05:55,120
but schedule pressure is not worth

145
00:05:58,629 --> 00:05:56,319
compromising

146
00:06:00,870 --> 00:05:58,639
the safety of the people working on it

147
00:06:03,350 --> 00:06:00,880
and the vehicle itself

148
00:06:04,309 --> 00:06:03,360
we depend on you to make sure that

149
00:06:07,029 --> 00:06:04,319
happens

150
00:06:08,550 --> 00:06:07,039
and to do that communication is

151
00:06:10,710 --> 00:06:08,560
extremely important

152
00:06:11,670 --> 00:06:10,720
you need to talk to the people that are

153
00:06:13,590 --> 00:06:11,680
doing the work

154
00:06:14,870 --> 00:06:13,600
and they need to talk to you

155
00:06:18,390 --> 00:06:14,880
communication

156
00:06:20,150 --> 00:06:18,400
is a two-way street i've seen several

157
00:06:22,390 --> 00:06:20,160
accidents in my life

158
00:06:23,749 --> 00:06:22,400
and they are usually not caused by a

159
00:06:26,550 --> 00:06:23,759
single event

160
00:06:27,430 --> 00:06:26,560
they're caused by a chain of events and

161
00:06:30,150 --> 00:06:27,440
all we need

162
00:06:31,990 --> 00:06:30,160
is one person to break that chain and

163
00:06:35,909 --> 00:06:32,000
you can prevent the accident

164
00:06:37,670 --> 00:06:35,919
so each of you needs to be diligent

165
00:06:39,430 --> 00:06:37,680
follow the processes which are so

166
00:06:40,070 --> 00:06:39,440
critical but you need to have a bigger

167
00:06:43,830 --> 00:06:40,080
view

168
00:06:48,070 --> 00:06:46,790
i've seen the shuttle program from a

169
00:06:51,510 --> 00:06:48,080
unique perspective

170
00:06:53,189 --> 00:06:51,520
i was around when we were first

171
00:06:55,510 --> 00:06:53,199
doing the initial requirements working

172
00:06:57,830 --> 00:06:55,520
in the astronaut office

173
00:06:59,749 --> 00:06:57,840
i had an opportunity to fly four of the

174
00:07:01,589 --> 00:06:59,759
initial flights

175
00:07:04,070 --> 00:07:01,599
then i got involved in space shuttle

176
00:07:05,430 --> 00:07:04,080
management ended my nasa career at the

177
00:07:08,309 --> 00:07:05,440
kennedy space center

178
00:07:09,589 --> 00:07:08,319
as the center director and then out in

179
00:07:12,469 --> 00:07:09,599
industry running one of the

180
00:07:14,309 --> 00:07:12,479
major contractors for the space shuttle

181
00:07:15,749 --> 00:07:14,319
space shuttle program is very dear to my

182
00:07:19,589 --> 00:07:15,759
heart

183
00:07:23,990 --> 00:07:21,990
we are depending on you i know you

184
00:07:26,150 --> 00:07:24,000
wanted to have the same

185
00:07:28,710 --> 00:07:26,160
kind of phenomenal lending as the

186
00:07:32,150 --> 00:07:28,720
phenomenal start it had

187
00:07:35,670 --> 00:07:32,160
we depend on you for a strong safe

188
00:07:35,680 --> 00:07:39,589
main gear touchdown